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Abstract
The steady increase in air traffic imposes a need for enhanced airport capacity, and the desire to
safely reduce existing separation minima. An important capacity constraint factor is the risk
imposed by wake vortices. In view of the uncertainties and the difficulties in understanding the
wake vortex phenomena, a novel WAke Vortex Induced Risk assessment (WAVIR) model has
been developed to evaluate wake vortex induced risk. The probabilistic model incorporates sub-
models for wake vortex evolution, wake vortex encounter, and flight path evolution, and relates
the severity of wake vortex encounters to incident / accident risk probability. The model is
applied to evaluate the risk related to different separation distances between aircraft landing on a
single runway. An extensive initial risk assessment is carried out to evaluate the impact of
weather and wind conditions and procedural aspects on incident/accident risk. The risk
assessment results are compared with proposed risk requirements to assess safe and appropriate
separation distances. It is shown that a reduction of the current separation minima  and
consequently an increase of capacity  might be possible under most operational and weather
conditions. However, it is also shown that the separation distances might need to be increased
under some particular weather conditions (e.g. low atmospheric turbulence).
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based policy making, Single runway approach, Air Traffic Management.
-3-
NLR-TP-2002-077
Contents
1 Introduction 4
2 Wake vortex risk based policy making 5
3 Probabilistic safety assessment model 6
4 Assessment of incident/accident risk 7
5 Conclusions and recommendations 10
Acknowledgements 11
References 11
(12 pages in total)
-4-
NLR-TP-2002-077
1 Introduction
The current separation minima for single runway approaches stem from the early 70s.
Although over the last 30 years they have 'proven to be sufficiently safe', the current safety level
is unclear. At the busiest airports, pilots continue to report wake vortex related incidents. With
the steady increase in air traffic, the design of new high capacity aircraft and the continuous
changes in Air Traffic Management (ATM) concepts and procedures, there is an urgent need to
re-examine the current wake vortex separation rules. It is also recognised that safety is a key
quality that should be guaranteed. This requires tools and methods to enable quantitative
assessment of wake vortex safety. In view of the uncertainties and the difficulties in
understanding of the wake vortex phenomena, this study follows a probabilistic approach.
WAVIR is based on a stochastic framework that incorporates the following sub models:
• Wake vortex evolution model: to predict wake transport and decay in different weather
conditions;
• Wake vortex encounter model: to predict the aircraft upset during an encounter;
• Flight path evolution model: to predict the aircraft movements and speed along the
flight track.
WAVIR can be used to assess the incident / accident risk related to different separation minima
for the current practice, and for promising new concepts that may enable a safe reduction of the
current separation minima. Identified safety bottlenecks can be fed back to the ATM designers,
who can use these results to redesign or improve their proposed ATM concept.
This paper outlines the WAVIR methodology and illustrates its application to single runway
approaches under different weather, wind and operational conditions.
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2 Wake vortex risk based policy making
The methodology to assess wake vortex induced risk proposes that a safety management
approach to regulate and control wake vortex induced risk should be based on an assessment of
incident/accident risk probabilities, followed by a comparison with risk criteria. This requires
the development of a probabilistic relation between wake vortex encounter severity and risk
metrics that are related to the severity of accidents, incidents and related conditions.
Classification schemes from International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO (1994, 1998)) and
Joint Aviation Authorities (JAA, 1994) are combined to obtain the risk event classification (see
Speijker et al. (2000a)):
1. Catastrophic accident: the aircraft encountering a wake vortex hits the ground, resulting in
loss of life;
2. Hazardous accident: the wake vortex encounter results in one or more on-board fatalities or
serious injuries (but no crash into the ground);
3. Major incident: the wake vortex encounter results in one or more non-serious injuries, but no
fatality, on-board the encountering aircraft;
4. Minor incident: the encounter results in inconvenience to occupants or an increase in crew
workload.
In close co-ordination with National Air Traffic Services (NATS), a method to derive safe and
appropriate separation minima for different operational, weather and wind conditions has been
introduced (see Mason (2000)). The method is based on a comparison with risk criteria in terms of
Target Level of Safety (TLS):
• Risk metrics in terms of incident / accident probabilities per movement;
• Risk requirements derived on the basis of historical incident data from Heathrow airport
(Table 1).
     Table 1: Risk Requirements (Probability Per Movement)
Risk Events Catastrophic
Accident
Hazardous
Accident
Major
Incident
Minor
Incident
Proposed TLS 0.9 × 10-8 3.0 × 10-7 1.0 × 10-5 5.0 × 10-4
The method proposes that all four risk requirements are to be satisfied, and that the most
stringent requirement determines the required separation minima (see Figure 4).
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3 Probabilistic safety assessment model
To numerically assess wake vortex induced risk the three sub models for flight path evolution,
wake vortex evolution, and wake vortex encounter are integrated in the WAVIR tool as
sketched in Figure 1.
Figure 1: Overview of WAVIR modelling relations and dependencies
In this paper the model is applied to the approach phase of aircraft, but the method can also be
applied to other flight phases. For the relevant input parameters probability distributions, based
on empirical data and/or state-of-the-art literature, are determined. Monte Carlo simulations are
carried out with wake vortex evolution and encounter models to calculate the (conditional)
instantaneous risk at different positions along the aircraft flight track. The wake vortex induced
incident/accident risk is then obtained by maximising these instantaneous risk curves over the
entire aircraft flight track. For a given longitudinal position x along the aircraft flight track, the
flight path evolution model yields probability distributions for the lateral and vertical position of
leader and trailer aircraft. Conditional on prescribed separation distance at the runway threshold,
a probability distribution is determined for the period of time elapsed between the generation of
the wake and the time instant that the trailer has position x along the aircraft flight track. This
time period distribution is then used to predict the vortex position and strength at the time of
encounter with the trailer.
The wake vortex evolution model predicts the motion and decay of the vortex pair. The physical
evolution of wake vortices is strongly influenced by weather and wind. Wake vortex decay is
enhanced in an ambient turbulence environment. Under stable stratification conditions, vortices
will decay but may stall or rise. Wind shear, with weak turbulence and weak stable stratification
may enhance stalling or rising vortices without significant decay. Vortices may stall or rebound
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to the glide path in the convective, stable stratified and sheared boundary layer (Gerz et al.
(2001)). Different wake vortex evolution models are available, and it is remarked that the
presented results are based on the models of Greene (1986) and Corjon & Poinsot (1996, 1997)
and account for stratification, atmospheric turbulence, ground effects, and wind effects
(headwind, tailwind, crosswind and vertical winds).
Within this study, roll control ratio is used as encounter severity metric. Different models are
available (e.g. Tatnall (1995), Kuzmin (1997), Woodfield (1995)) to determine the roll control
ratio, and it is noted that the wake vortex induced rolling moment on the trailer is computed and
compared to its maximum roll control moment following Tatnall (1995). An overview of basic
scaling laws and methods to assess the roll control ratio is given in De Bruin (2000).
A more extensive overview of the WAVIR methodology  including the incident / accident
prediction model that relates the severity of encounters to the risk events  and its initial
application to the single runway approach can be found in Speijker et al. (2000b, 2001). The
tool is being validated through a comparison of results with incident data obtained at Heathrow
airport using Flight Data Recorder (FDR) data analysis of up to 80,000 flights, including actual
encounters.
4 Assessment of incident/accident risk
WAVIR has been applied to study the wake vortex safety aspects of single runway approaches.
An initial risk assessment  with a Boeing 737 landing behind a Boeing 747-400  has been
carried out. The impact of weather and wind conditions (turbulence, stratification, crosswinds
and head- and tailwinds) and procedural aspects (e.g. glide slope intercept altitudes, navigation
accuracy, glide path angles, steep descent approaches) on incident/accident risk has been
evaluated.
Figure 2 shows the positions and strengths of vortex pairs generated at 400 m before the runway
threshold for a trailer aircraft with 5 NM prescribed separation. The ellipse indicates a 2σ
interval of the trailer aircraft position. Figure 3 shows the Major Incident Risk along the
Instrument Landing System (ILS) glide path with prescribed separation distances of 2, 3, 4, 5,
and 6 NM at the runway threshold (and with average atmospheric turbulence and stratification,
and no crosswind). Similar figures can be derived for the other three risk events. Clearly the risk
is highest near the runway threshold, a conclusion also found for the other three risk events
(Speijker et al. (2001)). This leads to the conclusion that the impact of procedural changes
further along the glide path on incident / accident risk will be low.
-8-
NLR-TP-2002-077
Provisions governing wake turbulence separation minima are published by ICAO (1996a,
1996b, 1984), and depend on the weight classes of the involved aircraft and the available
equipment (e.g. radar or non-radar operations). Figure 4 illustrates the method to derive safe and
appropriate separation distances for a specific operational, weather and wind condition. Clearly
under these conditions, the current ICAO prescribed separation minima of 5 NM might be
reduced to facilitate an increase in runway capacity.
Figure 4: Method to derive safe and appropriate separation minima
Figure 2: Position and strength data of
vortices with 2σ ellipse of the position of
the follower aircraft at 5 NM separation
Figure 3: Instantaneous Major Incident
risk curves for different separation
distances.
Target Levels
of Safety
Safe separation
distance
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The probabilistic model has been applied to evaluate the sensitivity of incident/accident risk to
variations in lateral and vertical navigation performance, atmospheric turbulence, stratification
effects, wind situation, and different flight tracks of the trailer aircraft (different glide slope
intercept altitude and different glide path angles). The results are summarised in Figure 5 below.
Figure 5: Derived Separation Minima under different operational and weather conditions for a
B737 behind a B747.
Figure 5 shows that a reduction of the current separation minima - and consequently an increase
in capacity  might be possible under most operational and weather conditions. However, it is
also shown that the separation distances might need to be increased under some particular
conditions. The results show that the impact of the investigated procedural aspects  as
compared to the impact of weather and wind conditions  is relatively small, which implies that
the evaluated changes in ATM procedures at present will not allow safe reduction of separation
distances. In order to do so, the first step should include a reduction of risk near the runway
threshold (e.g. definition of measures to reduce the probability and/or consequences of such an
encounter). The risk assessment results also show that  for single runway approaches  the
largest runway capacity improvement might be achieved through exploiting weather conditions
favourable for a rapid decay (or destruction) of the vortices. Since weather is airport dependent,
it might be possible to safely authorise different separation distances for different airports
around the world. This leads to the conclusion that warning for unfavourable evolution of the
vortices (in terms of position and strength in relation to the encountering trailer aircraft) is most
efficient. This can be achieved through an integrated Air Traffic Control (ATC) wake vortex
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system that can be used by controllers or on-board instrumentation for wake vortex detection
and avoidance.
5 Conclusions and recommendations
A probabilistic approach has been followed to evaluate wake vortex induced risk in relation to
different separation distances between landing aircraft on a single runway. The WAVIR
methodology  integrating sub models for wake vortex evolution, wake encounter and flight
path evolution  has been incorporated in a stochastic framework that facilitates the evaluation
of e.g. newly proposed ATM procedures, aircraft design changes and/or wake alleviation
instrumentation systems. The initial risk assessment results have been compared with proposed
risk requirements to derive safe and appropriate separation minima for different operational,
weather and wind conditions. It has been shown that a reduction of the current separation
minima might be possible under most operational and weather conditions. However, it has also
been shown that separation minima might need to be increased under some particular weather
conditions. It was also found that the evaluated changes in ATM procedures at present will
probably not allow safe reduction of separation distances. It was found that the highest risk is
located near the runway threshold. This implies that weather based prediction, monitoring and
warning systems should focus on exploiting weather and wind conditions favourable for rapid
transport and decay of the vortices near the runway threshold. Clearly the first step towards such
an operational system should include a reduction of risk near the runway threshold, including
measures to reduce the probability and/or consequences of a wake vortex encounter. A risk
management framework has been proposed to judge the acceptability of wake vortex induced
risk. It is recommended that this framework is further elaborated by regulatory authorities
towards new and modified harmonised wake vortex safety regulation with the aim to support
the introduction of new wake alleviation systems and procedures. It is also recommended that
the WAVIR tool is further developed towards a real-time aircraft spacing predictor which can
be incorporated in an integrated ATC wake vortex decision support system that facilitates the
use of dynamic weather dependent separation minima by controllers. As regards to weather
prediction, such system should include a validated probabilistic nowcasting weather model for
short term (i.e. at least 20 minutes) prediction of wind and temperature at or near the runway
threshold.
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